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introduCtion
Before the turn of the century, international migration 
had an extremely low profile on the global development 
agenda. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
for example, make no mention at all of international 
migration. Although a number of studies have attempted 
to “mainstream” migration into the MDGs after the fact, it 
is still largely ignored in official assessments of progress 
made towards them (Usher, 2005; Crush and Frayne 2007; 
Skeldon, 2008). According to the United Nations (UN), the 
silence surrounding migration in the MDGs was because it 
was too divisive and sensitive an issue between developed 
and developing countries (United Nations Population 
Fund [UNFPA], 2005). At the time, cooperation between 
North and South on the governance of migration more 
broadly seemed highly unlikely. Nation states in the North 
increasingly believed that their territorial sovereignty 
was under threat from irregular migration from the 
South, and states in the South saw their development 
prospects undermined by a crippling “brain drain” to 
the North. Repeated efforts by the UN to convene an 
international conference on migration in the late 1990s 
were unsuccessful.
Since 2000, however, international migration has moved 
to the top of the global governance agenda and a whole 
range of bilateral and multilateral partnerships have taken 
shape (Koser, 2010; Newland, 2010; Betts, 2011; Hansen, 
Koehler and Money, 2011; Koslowski, 2011; Kunz, Lavenex 
and Pannizon, 2011). This process began with various 
initiatives within the UN, notably the 2003 Doyle Report 
to Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his appointment 
of a special rapporteur on migration and development. 
Outside the UN, discussions about international migration 
gathered momentum with the appointment of the Global 
Commission on International Migration (GCIM) and the 
first UN High Level Dialogue (HLD) on International 
Migration and Development in 2006 (GCIM, 2005; UN, 
2006). In 2007, the first meeting of the new Global Forum 
on Migration and Development (GFMD) was convened 
in Brussels. This was followed by annual meetings in 
the Philippines in 2008; Greece in 2009; Mexico in 2010; 
Switzerland in 2011; and Mauritius in 2012. 
The GFMD is a state‐led, voluntary, non‐binding 
consultative process open to all member states and observer 
states of the UN (Omelianuk, 2008; 2012; Newland, 2012). 
In 2009, the major UN agencies, plus the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), combined to form the 
Global Migration Group (GMG) with a brief to “promote 
the wider application of all relevant international and 
regional instruments and norms relating to migration, 
and to encourage the adoption of more coherent, 
comprehensive and better coordinated approaches to the 
issue of international migration” (GMG, 2012). In 2010, the 
GMG issued a handbook for states with recommendations 
on how to mainstream migration into their development 
planning and vice-versa (GMG, 2010).
Another notable feature of the “new optimism” around 
international migration is the growth of cooperation on the 
issue within and between regional blocs of states. Regional 
consultative processes (RCPs) on migration, for example, 
now exist in many parts of the globe (Thouez and Channac, 
2006; Hansen, 2010). While the original focus of many 
RCPs was migration management, issues of migration 
and development grew increasingly on their agendas. In 
Southern Africa, for example, the Migration Dialogue for 
Southern Africa (MIDSA) was founded by IOM and SAMP 
as a non-binding consultative forum for Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) states in 2002 and 
meets on an annual basis. Originally focussed on regional 
cooperation in managed migration, the MIDSA agenda has 
been increasingly shaped by migration and development 
issues. In addition to the RCPs, geographically dispersed 
blocs of states also moved migration and development 
higher on their lists of priorities: these include the 
Commonwealth, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, the African Union (AU) and 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States 
(AU, 2006a; AU, 2006b; ACP, 2010; Gagnon and Khoudour-
Castéras, 2011; de Boeck, 2012; Melde, 2012; OECD, 2012; 
Ramphal Institute, 2012).
The most recent trend is the emergence of increased 
dialogue and cooperation on international migration 
between blocs of states. The European Union (EU) has been 
a central player in many of these initiatives. Following the 
adoption of its Global Approach to Migration (GAM) in 
2005, the EU pursued “mobility partnerships” with major 
migrant-sending regions and countries (Parkes, 2009; 
Devisscher, 2011; Reslow, 2012). In relation to Africa, the 
Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and 
Development, held in Rabat, Morocco in July 2006, was 
followed by the Joint EU-AU Declaration on Migration 
and Development in Tripoli, Libya in November that 
year.1 One of the outcomes of the declaration is the 
recent Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and 
Employment (MME). The MME partnership commits the 
parties to dialogue on a broad range of issues, including 
diasporas; remittances; brain drain; migrant rights; the 
social consequences of migration; regular, circular and 
irregular migration; visa issues; smuggling and trafficking 
of migrants; readmission and return; refugee protection; 
the mobility of students; and harmonization processes. 
The partnership’s current 12-point action plan includes 
the establishment of an African Institute for Remittances 
in Addis Ababa, the implementation of the Ouagadougou 
Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings and 
the Diaspora Outreach Initiative.
1  See: www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47fdfb010.html.
CIGI PaPers no. 16 — aPrIl 2013 
6 • the Centre for InternatIonal GovernanCe InnovatIon
In the space of a decade, how and why has migration 
shifted from being an issue that was of marginal interest 
on the international development agenda to one that 
is increasingly at its centre? How has one of the most 
contentious North-South issues of the 1990s become 
the focus of so much bilateral and multilateral dialogue 
and cooperation between them? The first section of this 
paper provides a possible answer to these questions, 
which provides a context for understanding the nature of 
cooperation between the EU and ACP Group of States on 
international migration governance.
froM threat to lever
Most existing discussions about EU migration policy 
towards states and regions outside of it emphasize the 
threat of in-migration to “Fortress Europe” as the driving 
concern (Geddes, 1999; 2012; Albrecht, 2002; Caviedes, 
2004; Gebrewold-Tochalo, 2007; Luedkte, 2009). This 
“fortress” or “migration as threat” perspective is inward-
looking and control-oriented in its policy outcomes, and is 
inherently unlikely to garner any sympathy from migrant-
sending states in the South. As Geddes points out, framing 
the issue in terms of the “threat” of migration is a “cause of 
irritation” to African countries, particularly as those same 
countries see that EU countries are only too willing to 
open their doors to skilled migrants, “draining the brains” 
of Africa and the rest of the global South (Geddes, 2012: 
406). The “migration-as-threat” policy approach provides 
little basis for dialogue and cooperation between migrant-
sending and migrant-receiving states, as the experience of 
the 1990s made all too clear.
Over the last decade, however, international migration has 
increasingly been reframed as a development issue. One of 
the consequences of this reframing is that states formerly 
at loggerheads now have a common language and the 
appearance of complementary interests on migration 
management (Lahav, 2008). After all, no one disputes 
that “development” is a good thing for the South; thus, 
anything that enhances development should be viewed 
in a similarly positive light. While many states continue 
to view migration primarily through a security lens, the 
overall result has been the emergence of an alternative 
“migration-as-development lever” perspective, which has 
laid the basis for new forms of inter-regional cooperation 
and dialogue. Understanding this global shift in thinking 
is essential to an analysis of the nature and content of 
EU-ACP cooperation on international migration. The 
migration-as-development lever discourse contains at 
least five points of agreement around which the interests 
of regional blocs in the North and South have coalesced.
The first point of agreement is that poverty and a lack 
of development are the “root causes” of international 
migration. Instead of erecting barricades to migrants, an 
alternative policy approach is to remove the incentive to 
move in the first place. The only way to do this effectively 
is through poverty reduction and economic development 
in the source regions of the South. The root causes doctrine 
is an article of faith in EU policy circles and is also perfectly 
palatable in the South, since its logical consequence is 
increased flows of foreign direct investment and official 
development assistance:
The primary challenge is to tackle the main 
push factors for migration: poverty and 
lack of employment opportunities. The 
EU must recognise that creating jobs in 
developing countries could significantly 
reduce migratory pressure from Africa. 
Migrants should be supported in 
contributing to the development of 
their countries of origin…Promoting 
investments in labour-intensive sectors 
in regions with high outward migration 
will be an important priority, in a wider 
context of facilitating intra-African 
labour migration and mobility. (European 
Commission [EC], 2006: 5-6) 
Climate change has recently been added to the list of root 
causes of migration (Brown, 2008; Martin, 2010; Piguet, 
Pécoud and de Guchtenaire, 2011). Despite the fact that 
the root causes argument has many academic critics who 
contend that economic development actually increases 
migration and mobility, it remains a shared policy belief 
and the conceptual foundation of much inter-regional 
cooperation (Gent, 2002; Lindstrøm, 2005; de Haas, 2007; 
Castles and van Hear, 2011).
The second point of agreement is that migrant remittances 
from North to South have positive short- and long-term 
development implications for the migrant-sending 
countries, communities and households (Kapur, 2004; 
Bali and Balli, 2011; Gupta, Patillo and Wagh, 2009; 
Mundaca, 2009; Ratha et al., 2011). In 2012, officially 
recorded global remittance flows exceeded US$400 billion, 
80 percent of which went to developing countries. In the 
South, remittance inflows are now three times as high 
as official development assistance. Remittance outflows 
from EU countries reached US$108 billion in 2008, up 
from US$29 billion in 2000. While no one disputes the 
fact that remittance flows are massive and growing, there 
is a vigorous debate on their development impacts and 
potential. The consensus in policy circles is that remittances 
are a significant source of external finance for developing 
countries, but should neither be confused with, nor seen as 
a substitute for, official aid (Lindley, 2011). Nevertheless, 
remittances are seen as a way of addressing the root 
causes of migration, as they reduce poverty and dampen 
pressures for out-migration. States in the North and South 
not only agree that remittances are a positive outcome of 
international migration, but moreover, that their impact on 
development can be maximized by reducing, for example, 
Between north and south: the eu-aCP MIGratIon relatIonshIP 
Jonathan Crush • 7
transaction costs for migrants through more formal and 
accessible remitting channels, and by introducing policies 
that promote the development “multiplier effects” of 
remittances, such as a growth in savings, investment, 
employment and productive activity.
The third point of agreement derives from the observation 
that migrants engage in a wide range of activities, 
maintaining their linkages with, and contributing to the 
development of their countries of origin. In the EU, such 
activities once signified a failure of migrant integration; 
today, these same migrants are recast as the diaspora, who 
often play major roles in the development of their countries 
of origin (Nurse, 2004; Plaza and Ratha, 2011; Durutalo, 
2012). In other words, the idea that there is a crippling 
“brain drain” from the South has been largely replaced 
by the idea of engaging diasporas for development. The 
AU has even rebranded the African diaspora as the “sixth 
region” of the continent and held the first Global African 
Diaspora Forum in South Africa in 2012.
Increasingly common worldwide, diaspora engagement 
events seek to promote a range of initiatives, such as 
collective remitting, philanthropy, tourism, investment 
and entrepreneurship, knowledge networks, bonds, 
technology transfer and return migration (Kuznetsov, 2006; 
Brinkerhoff, 2009; Newland and Tanaka, 2010; Plaza and 
Ratha, 2011; Agunias and Newland, 2012). Increasingly, 
diasporic communities are even viewed as “development 
agents” and “partners” in policy circles in both the North 
and South.
The fourth point of agreement is encapsulated in the idea 
of “co-development,” which suggests that international 
migration is beneficial for all those involved:
True co-development involves sustained 
cooperation between receiving nations 
and source nations in the management of 
both legal and illegal migratory flows. At 
the same time, it fosters the economic and 
demographic development of both the 
sending and the receiving country. This 
cooperation is based in large measure on 
understanding that, more than ever before, 
the best migration policy for developed 
nations is one that seeks not to block, but 
to smoothly regulate the circulation and 
re-circulation of the majority of foreigners 
and immigrants. (Weil, 2002)
Co-development, in the form of temporary circular 
migration for work, is a “triple win” for all concerned: 
temporary labour market needs in the EU are met; 
countries of origin receive remittances and new skills 
acquired by returning migrants; and migrants themselves 
earn income and acquire new knowledge and skills 
without “giving up their roots” (de Wenden, 2008; 
Newland, 2009; de Bergh, 2009). Circular migration can 
also be more easily “sold” to skeptical publics in Europe. 
While researchers have criticized the co-development 
concept, which suggests that the benefits of migration are 
equally shared by states and temporary migrants (who 
are, in fact, often highly exploited), the concept itself is 
powerful, convincing states in the South that, in meeting 
the labour needs of the North, they share its interests.
The fifth and final point of agreement is that intra-regional 
freedom of movement is economically beneficial for both 
origin and destination states. While this principle is viewed 
with skepticism by many states in the North and South, it is 
a founding principle in several regional compacts between 
groups of states. It has clearly achieved greatest practical 
application in the EU, but is also embedded in the founding 
documents of regional blocs throughout the ACP, including 
the AU, the Economic Community of West African States, 
the SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa, the East African Community and the Caribbean 
Community. Dogged by individual state opposition and 
prevarication, the actual implementation of the principle 
has generally been quite limited. Nevertheless, the new 
interface between migration and development over the last 
decade has given impetus to the idea that the development 
of both sending and receiving states in the South will be 
enhanced by greater labour mobility across international 
borders (Pécoud and de Guchteneire, 2007).
Allied to the argument for policies that facilitate intra-
regional migration, is the attention now being paid to 
South-South migration (Ratha and Shaw, 2007; Bakewell, 
2009; Hujo and Piper, 2010; Gagnon and Khoudour-
Castéras, 2012). On a global scale, South-South migration 
is clearly a significant phenomenon. In 2010, for example, 
it accounted for one-third of all migrants worldwide (UN, 
2012). While South-South migration seems a natural subject 
for South-South dialogue and cooperation, its interest 
and relevance to the EU are not immediately apparent. 
Understanding why the EU might take an interest in 
South-South migration is critical if we are to make sense of 
the EU-ACP migration relationship. 
MaPPing Migration
The sources for mapping migration within and from 
the ACP Group of States are few and dated. The most 
comprehensive source is the University of Sussex 
Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalization 
and Poverty’s Global Migrant Origins Database (GMOD), 
which was last updated in 2007. By aggregating the 
bilateral flows between countries on a regional basis 
from this database, it is possible to draw some general 
conclusions about migration that help to explain the 
distinctive geographical focus of the EU-ACP migration 
relationship. According to the GMOD, a total of 23 million 
migrants from ACP countries live outside their country of 
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birth (Table 1). Of these, 37 percent are resident in the North 
(Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand) and 
63 percent are in the global South. Overall, South-South 
migration is an extremely significant phenomenon for the 
ACP and far more important than migration to the North. 
At the same time, the relative importance of South-South 
migration varies considerably from region to region and 
sub-region to sub-region. In Africa, for example, South-
South migrants make up 78 percent of the total of all 
migration, compared with only 24 percent in the Pacific 
and 15 percent in the Caribbean. The most common 
destinations for Caribbean migrants are the United States 
and Canada (70 percent of total migration), while Australia 
and New Zealand are most important for migrants from 
the Pacific region (48 percent of the total). Within Africa, 
there is also considerable inter-regional variation in South-
South migration, which varies from a high of 83 percent of 
migrants in West Africa to a low of 48 percent in Southern 
Africa.
table 1: south-south and south-North Migration from the ACP Group of states, 2007
region of origin total number of 
Migrants from all 
regions
total number of 
Migrants to states in 
the north
Percentage 
of overall 
Migration
total number of 
Migrants to states in the 
south
Percentage of overall 
Migration
southern africa 888,504 462,022 52.0 426,482 48.0
eastern africa 5,520,343 1,468,411 26.6 4,051,932 73.4
west africa 8,130,420 1,341,519 16.5 6,788,901 83.5
Central africa 3,007,541 634,591 21.1 2,372,950 78.9
total africa 17,546,808 3,906,543 22.3 13,640,265 77.7
total Caribbean 5,199,538 4,414,408 84.9 785,130 15.1
total Pacific 466,526 352,694 75.6 113,832 24.4
total 23,212,872 8,673,645 37.4 14,539,227 62.6
Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from GMOD, 2007.
In both absolute and relative terms, migration from the 
ACP countries to the EU seems relatively insignificant, 
compared to migration to other regions (Table 2). A total 
of 3.5 million ACP migrants (78 percent of whom are from 
the African region) live in the EU. However, they make up 
only 15 percent of the total number of ACP migrants. In 
the case of the Pacific, the figure is as low as 4 percent. 
In virtually every ACP region and sub-region, fewer than 
20 percent of migrants are in the EU. In West Africa, the 
figure is only 11 percent. In other words, despite the high 
media profile given to migration from Africa to Europe, 
it is only a relatively small component of total African 
migration movement. This is enough for some in the EU 
to pursue a security-driven fortress agenda and others to 
be concerned that the numbers will increase in the future if 
the root causes of migration are not addressed; however, it 
is certainly insufficient to justify the moral panic often felt 
in the EU. Just as important, these figures help to explain 
why South-South, rather than ACP-EU, migration has 
become a major area of cooperation between the two blocs.
table 2: Migration from ACP Group of states to the eu, 2007
region of origin total number of 
Migrants from all 
regions
number of 
Migrants settling 
in the eu
Percentage of 
overall Migration
number of Migrants 
settling outside the eu
Percentage of overall 
Migration
southern africa 888,504 241,293 27.2 647,211 72.8
eastern africa 5,520,343 1,021,392 18.5 4,498,951 81.5
west africa 8,130,420 932,707 11.5 7,197,713 88.5
Central africa 3,007,541 581,397 19.3 2,426,144 80.7
total africa 17,546,808 2,776,789 15.8 14,770,019 84.2
total Caribbean 5,199,538 760,034 14.6 4,439,504 85.4
total Pacific 466,526 17,673 3.8 448,853 96.2
total 23,212,872 3,554,496 15.3 19,658,376 84.7
Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from GMOD, 2007.
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The majority of South-South ACP migration is intra-
regional, that is, between countries in the same regional 
bloc. For example, 12.2 million, or 86 percent of South-
South migrants move to another country within the same 
ACP region (Table 3). Only 1.9 million (14 percent) move 
to non-ACP countries in the South. However, this overall 
pattern disguises important inter-regional differences. In 
Africa, for example, 90 percent of South-South migrants 
move to another ACP state within Africa. The rest migrate 
to non-ACP African states (North Africa) and the Middle 
East. Extra-regional migration is highest from Eastern 
Africa (20 percent) and lowest from West Africa (5 
percent). Intra-Caribbean migration, by contrast, makes 
up only one-third of South-South migration in that ACP 
region. The other two-thirds migrate to Mexico, Central 
and South America. In the Pacific, intra-ACP migration is 
even less significant (at 10 percent of migration). The major 
South-South destination for Pacific islanders tends to be 
Southeast Asian countries.
table 3: Intra-regional Migration Within the ACP Group of states, 2007
region of origin number of south-south 
Migrants
number of Intra-
regional Migrants
Percentage of 
overall Migration
number of extra-regional 
Migrants
Percentage of overall 
Migration
southern africa 426,482 385,986 90.5 40,496 9.5
eastern africa 4,051,932 3,232,712 79.8 819,220 20.2
west africa 6,788,901 6,435,227 94.8 353,674 5.2
Central africa 2,372,950 2,237,911 94.3 135,039 5.7
total africa 13,640,265 12,291,836 90.1 1,349,429 9.9
total Caribbean 785,130 266,216 33.9 518,914 66.1
total Pacific 113,832 11,429 10.0 102,403 90.0
total 14,539,227 12,569,481 86.4 1,970,746 13.6
Source:  Author’s calculations, compiled from GMOD, 2007.
In sum, South-South migration is the most important 
form of migration for the ACP as a whole. Intra-regional 
migration is also very significant, either to other ACP 
states (Africa) or to neighbouring regions in the South 
(the Caribbean and the Pacific). The information base on 
South-South migration is, however, extremely limited, 
and policy making around migration and development 
is severely hampered by the paucity of information. As 
a result, it is perhaps not surprising that the impetus for 
the EU-ACP Group of States’ cooperation on migration 
focuses so strongly on South-South migration and on 
filling the knowledge gaps that currently exist.
develoPing the Migration 
PartnerShiP
The 2000 Cotonou Agreement, which entered into force 
in April 2003, provides the framework for cooperation 
between the EU and the ACP countries across a broad 
range of issues. Article 13 of the agreement specifies that 
“[t]he issue of migration shall be the subject of in-depth 
dialogue in the framework of the ACP-EU Partnership” 
(EC, 2010). What stands out in Article 13 is the focus on 
migration control. The parties agree to the deportation of 
“illegal immigrants,” including third-country nationals 
and, moreover, to develop strategies “aim[ed] at reducing 
poverty, improving living and working conditions, 
creating employment and developing training contribute 
in the long term to normalising migratory flows” (EC, 
2010). To that end, the EU committed to supporting the 
economic and social development of, and reducing 
poverty in, the migrants’ regions of origin. In other words, 
while the threat of migration was clearly paramount in 
EU thinking, the trade-off for cooperation on control was 
development assistance to reduce migration flows by 
addressing its root causes. One critic has suggested that 
this trade-off means that the EU was, in effect, “turning 
development aid into a tool for implementing restrictive 
and security-driven immigration policies which are at 
odds with its commitment to make migration work for 
development” (European NGO Confederation for Relief 
and Development [CONCORD], 2010).
In June 2006, the report of the ACP-EU Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly noted that it would debate 
and make recommendations on “migration issues and 
the contribution which it [sic] can make to ways which 
will foster development in the countries of origin and to 
action designed to counter trafficking in human beings” 
(ACP-EU, 2006). That same month, the ACP-EC Council 
of Ministers meeting in Papua, New Guinea “concluded 
a major agreement on financing the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement” and also “held a debate on migration and 
development, reflecting the importance of development 
policy in managing trends in migration for the benefit of 
both regions of origin and destination” (Council of the 
EU, 2006). Clearly influenced by the global reframing 
of migration as a development issue, the EU and ACP 
initiated a new type of dialogue on the migration file.
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Despite considerable pressure, however, the shift was 
not reflected in either the 2005 or 2010 revisions to the 
Cotonou Agreement, which left Article 13 intact (Koeb and 
Hohmeister, 2010). The failure of the EU and ACP to reach 
an agreement on a reworded Article 13 resides primarily in 
the clause on readmission, which the EU insists should be 
binding for all ACP countries. In 2010, a joint declaration 
on Article 13 was issued, noting that the two parties had 
agreed to strengthen and deepen their dialogue and 
cooperation in the area of migration, building on the three 
pillars: migration and development, including issues 
relating to diasporas, brain drain and remittances; legal 
migration, including admission, mobility and movement 
of skills and services; and illegal migration, including 
smuggling and trafficking of human beings and border 
management, as well as readmission. The declaration laid 
the groundwork for an ongoing conversation on the first 
pillar through the ACP-EU Dialogue on Migration and 
Development.
The 2010 dialogue focused on remittances and South-South 
migration corridors, including promoting competitiveness 
and transparency in the financial products market; 
broadening the range of formal channels used to send 
and receive remittances; allowing migrants to open bank 
accounts in both source and receiving countries; decreasing 
the costs of remittances; and promoting education to 
enhance the management and development impact of 
remittances. The second dialogue in April 2012, however, 
reverted to the readmission issue. It was at this meeting 
that the deep divisions between the EU and the ACP over 
revisions to the security components of Article 13 were 
once again apparent.
The degree to which the ACP’s view of migration was 
increasingly dominated by the idea of migration as a lever 
of development is evident in both the ACP’s 2006 Brussels 
Declaration on Asylum, Migration and Mobility, and its 
2008 Brussels Resolution on Migration and Development. 
The 2006 declaration cites conflicts, poverty, population 
growth, poor management, underdevelopment, lack of 
opportunities and environmental issues as contributory 
factors to migration and asserts that “effective 
management of migration requires that these root causes 
be examined” (ACP, 2006). In addition, it notes that “the 
issue of irregular or forced migration is being addressed 
in terms of security considerations, rather than in the 
wider context of development that takes account of the 
problems of migration in development” (ACP, 2006). 
The declaration also contains a section on “The Role of 
the Diaspora in Development” and pledges concerted 
action (in collaboration with banking institutions, the EU, 
and regional and national authorities) to promote “cost-
effective transfer of funds that are currently dominated 
by cash transfer offices, aimed at reducing costs and 
eliminating the bias against remittances in national and 
regional regulatory systems” and engaging with diaspora 
organizations in schemes that “highlight the positive role 
of the Diaspora for channeling their knowledge, skills and 
financial resources to their home countries” (ACP, 2006). 
The declaration’s plan of action includes the establishment 
of an Intra-ACP Migration Facility and the ACP Migration 
Observatory.
The 2008 Brussels Resolution on Migration and 
Development focusses even more explicitly on migration 
as a development issue. The preamble, for example, notes 
that migration and mobility programs and principles are 
“important instruments for sustainable development” 
(ACP, 2008) and contribute to the attainment of the 
MDGs. Further, it suggests that there is a need to manage 
the root causes, impacts and consequences of migration 
while exploiting migration to the benefit of sustainable 
development (ibid.). The resolution identifies the following 
four areas for action:
• the contribution of migrants and diaspora to 
sustainable development, which includes: the 
research and promotion of the role of migrants’ and 
diasporas’ networks; sharing migration experiences 
and its positive aspects, such as the transfer of 
technology and enhanced skills and remittances; the 
development and promotion of innovative solutions 
for curbing illegal migration and brain drain through 
“brain gain” and the implementation of flexible 
circular migration programs; strengthening national 
legal and financial environments for enhancing the 
multiplier effects of remittances; and reducing the 
cost of transfers “while recognising the private nature 
of these funds and that they can never be a substitute 
for official development aid”; 
• migration and environment, including better analysis 
of the nexus between migration and the environment, 
especially through research on environmentally 
related migration and the environmental impact of 
forced migration; 
• migration and human security; and 
• a consideration of migration in the identification of 
development projects and programs (ibid.).
Embedded in the language and actions of the both the 
declaration and the resolution are all of the central themes 
of the post-2000 global migration and development 
discourse.
The ACP’s 2011 Human Mobility Report continues in the 
same vein, explicitly proposing a suite of “migration-
friendly development policies” and “development-
friendly migration policies” (ACP, 2011: 17). The report 
initially advocates the “definitive abandonment” of the 
root causes approach to migration on the grounds that 
there is no evidence to support its basic premise. Almost 
immediately, however, the report reverses its position, 
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arguing that the root causes of migration remain a 
challenge for ACP, and that eliminating them is a priority. 
The root causes argument is then used to support the case 
for greater development assistance.
The report identifies five key challenges for the ACP Group 
of States: developing time- and cost-effective research 
tools for analyzing the mobility-development nexus in the 
ACP states, with particular emphasis on addressing the 
scarcity of comprehensive, reliable and comparable data 
on South-South migration; ensuring free, regulated and 
secure mobility, including enhanced circular migration; 
addressing environmentally induced migration, a “key 
policy challenge” for ACP countries in the twenty-
first century; integrating human mobility in national 
development strategies; and assuring the social cohesion, 
respect for, and protection of migrants in ACP countries.
Many regional blocs of states have very limited migration 
research capacity and rely quite heavily on outsourcing. 
The ACP has developed a different and more coherent 
approach by establishing the Intra-ACP Migration Facility, 
which includes the ACP Observatory on Migration, both 
based near the ACP Secretariat in Brussels. A private 
consultancy firm was selected to establish the capacity-
building components of the Facility and an IOM-led 
consortium was awarded the Observatory tender. In the 
two years since its public launch in Brussels in October 
2010, the Observatory has achieved a great deal while 
the rest of the Facility is yet to deliver on its mandate. 
The Observatory has an active academic advisory board 
with representation from 18 non-governmental research 
organizations throughout the ACP regions and has 
launched 27 separate research studies in 12 pilot countries 
and regions on topics prioritized by those country 
governments and regional organizations.
The Observatory manages an extremely active website 
and is a regular participant in international gatherings on 
migration and development (de Boeck, 2010). The primary 
research focus of the Observatory is on South-South 
migration, with a particular emphasis on remittances, 
diasporas and other aspects of the migration-development 
relationship. In a short space of time, the Observatory has 
emerged as the leading global information and research 
source on South-South mobility. It has also held technical 
capacity-building workshops for government officials 
on migration and development in all ACP regions, and 
convenes national stakeholder workshops in the ACP 
pilot countries. The success of the Observatory (which 
is funded by the EU) contrasts sharply with the rather 
limited achievements of the Facility. The future of both 
is now under review in Brussels. What is clear is that 
the Observatory’s research, policy and capacity-building 
agenda is completely consistent with the idea of migration 
as a development lever that currently preoccupies global 
players such as the GFMD and the UN HLD.
ConCluSionS
A comparison of the separate migration-related resolutions 
of the EU and ACP shows considerable overlap between the 
two. The EU’s 2005 GAM and its 2011 Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility (GAMM) lay out an agenda which 
certainly does not ignore the security “threat” of irregular 
migration and trafficking, but places great emphasis on 
the need for mobility partnerships and migration as a 
“development lever” (Lavenex and Kunz, 2008). The fourth 
pillar of the GAMM, entitled “maximising the development 
impact of migration and mobility,” proposes a range of 
related actions to “promote the beneficial development 
outcomes of migration.” (EC, 2011: 6; 18). These actions 
include remittances, diasporas and “the mainstreaming 
of migration in development thinking” (EC, 2011: 19). 
On the ACP side, as noted, migration is also framed as 
a development issue in the 2006 Declaration on Asylum, 
Migration and Mobility and the 2008 Brussels Resolution 
on Migration and Development (ACP, 2006; 2008). When 
both groups of states independently define migration as 
a development lever in this way, there is considerable 
common ground for a constructive conversation; however, 
nothing in these programmatic statements is original or 
unique to either the EU or the ACP. This is exactly the same 
set of issues, policies and prescriptions that run through a 
host of other initiatives including the GCIM, the UN HLD, 
the GFMD and the GMG. In other words, to understand 
the EU-ACP Group of States relationship, it is insufficient 
simply to look at what these two groups of states say to 
one another.
Why does the EU and ACP migration relationship focus 
primarily on South-South migration and not migration 
between the two blocs? This is a departure for the EU, 
whose other initiatives and MME partnerships are 
focussed on managing migration to the EU. As this paper 
has shown, South-South migration has recently come 
onto the global migration and development agenda and 
is commanding increasing international attention. But that 
does not, in itself, explain why the EU and the ACP should 
make it a focus of cooperation. The importance of South-
South migration to the ACP countries seems self-evident, 
but why would the EU take an interest?    
First, there is the argument in the EU’s own GAMM 
that “inter- and intra-regional migration in developing 
regions far exceeds migration to the EU. This ‘south-south’ 
migration often brings benefits to migrants in the form of 
better job opportunities and higher incomes than available 
at home” (EU, 2011: 18). In other words, the EU takes a 
broader position on the beneficial impacts of migration on 
development and is prepared to support ACP initiatives on 
South-South migration as part of its “aid package” to the 
group. Second, and more instrumentally, by encouraging 
greater intra- and inter-regional migration within the 
South, the EU is, in fact, addressing root causes, facilitating 
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alternative opportunities for migrants, and therefore, in its 
calculation, reducing migration pressure on Europe.
By framing their dialogue on international migration 
as a development rather than security issue, the EU 
and the ACP have actually made considerable progress 
since Cotonou. While points of disagreement remain, 
particularly over revisions to Article 13, the relationship 
is generally collegial and has defined common ground for 
productive exchange and practical programming. The two 
are now in regular dialogue over migration, and the EU 
has largely funded both the Intra-ACP Migration Facility 
and the influential ACP Observatory on Migration. This 
rapprochement would have been inconceivable in the 
1990s. This paper has attempted to explain this shift by 
contextualizing it, first, within a broader seismic shift in 
global migration governance, from conflict to cooperation, 
and second, within a broader change in the global discourse 
about migration itself.
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Barry Carin and david shorr
the failure of many observers to recognize the varied scale of the 
G20’s efforts has made it harder for the G20 to gain credit for the 
valuable role it can play. this paper offers five recommendations for 
the G20 to present a clearer understanding of how it functions and 
what it has to offer.
Policy Brief
East asian statEs,  
thE arctic council and 
intErnational rElations 
in thE arctic
James manicom and P. Whitney Lackenbauer
introduction
The significant changes taking place in the Arctic are attracting worldwide 
attention, often to the discomfort of Arctic states and peoples. This is no better 
demonstrated than by the East Asian states’ growing interest in Arctic issues. All 
three major East Asian states — China, Japan and South Korea — bid for Arctic 
Council membership in 2009 and all have active polar research programs. This 
interest has met with concern in several quarters, not least because of China’s 
perceived belligerence in its own claimed maritime areas and because of the 
widely held misperception that it claims some portion of the Arctic Ocean. 
KEy Points
• East Asian states do not perceive Arctic issues through an “Arctic” lens; rather, 
they are deemed “maritime” or “polar” issues. This preference reflects a global, 
rather than a regional, perspective on the Arctic. East Asian Arctic interests can 
thus be pursued in a range of international fora; they do not need Arctic Council 
membership to pursue their Arctic interests.
• The Arctic Council’s member states should welcome East Asian states as observers 
to enmesh them into “Arctic” ways of thinking; otherwise, these states may pursue 
their Arctic interests via other means, which would undermine the Arctic Council’s 
place as the primary authority on Arctic issues.
• The most important element of this integration will be to foster dialogue between 
East Asian states and the Arctic Council’s six permanent participants (PPs) that 
represent northern indigenous peoples.
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all three major east asian states — China, Japan and south Korea 
— have bid for artic Council membership and have active polar 
research programs, but their interest has met with concern in several 
quarters. this policy brief suggests that the arctic Council’s member 
states should welcome east asian states as observers to enmesh 
them into “arctic” ways of thinking. 
ConferenCe report
false dIchotomIes: economIcs 
and the challenGes of ouR tIme
Kevin english
this report, from the CIGI and Inet conference focusses on how 
economists should work with other areas of study, such as history, 
law, psychology and political economy, to enrich research and 
provide more well-rounded answers to the questions facing the 
economic community today.
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to Ensuring thE Early 
Warning ExErCisE is 
EffECtivE
Skylar BrookS, Warren Clarke, MiChael CoCkBurn, 
DuStyn lanz anD BeSSMa MoMani
introduCtion
The global financial crisis has shown the need for stronger surveillance and 
better foresight in financial governance. In 2009, the Group of Twenty (G20) 
sought to bolster these by initiating the semi-annual EWE. Two international 
institutions — the IMF and the FSB — were tasked with conducting the EWE. 
Although the EWE is a critical mechanism for identifying systemic risks and 
vulnerabilities, several problems constrain its effectiveness. The exercises 
suffer from unclear goals, a lack of coordination, geographical separation, 
insufficient organizational capacity and ad hoc procedures. 
KEy Points
• The Early Warning Exercise (EWE) was designed as a joint program between the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to identify 
low-probability systemic financial risks. Although cooperation between the IMF and 
FSB is central to the exercise, this needs to be significantly improved and strengthened 
to effectively alert and warn of potential crises.
• The EWE suffers from unclear goals, a lack of coordination, geographical separation, 
insufficient organizational capacity and ad hoc procedures.
• The EWE requires specific changes to address these shortcomings and would also 
benefit from a regular publication to boost its visibility and impact. 
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cooRdInatIon cRItIcal to 
ensuRInG the eaRly WaRnInG 
exeRcIse Is effectIve
Bessma Momani et al.
the need for stronger surveillance and better foresight in financial 
governance was made clear during the global financial crisis. the 
Group of twenty initiated the early warning exercise, which is a 
critical mechanism for identifying systemic risks and vulnerabilities; 
however, several problems constrain its effectiveness. 
Five Years aFter 
the Fall 
The Governance Legacies of the 
Global Financial Crisis
SpeCiaL RepoRT
fIve yeaRs afteR the fall: the 
GoveRnance leGacIes of the 
Global fInancIal cRIsIs
CIGI experts
the effects of the global financial crisis continue to be felt across 
a spectrum of issues five years later. the five papers that form the 
core of this special report provide insight and recommendations for 
building the governance arrangements required to deal with these 
enduring legacies.
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A Policy MisMAtch: 
cAnAdA And the 
United stAtes in 
the AsiA-PAcific 
Region
James manICom
a PolIcy mIsmatch: canada and 
the unIted states In the asIa-
PacIfIc ReGIon
James Manicom
the united states and Canada, two of the world’s closest allies, have 
reinvigorated their diplomatic and military postures toward the asia-
Pacific region. on balance, however, Canada may not be an ideal 
Pacific partner for the united states.
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Are Short SellerS 
PoSitive FeedbAck 
trAderS? evidence 
From the GlobAl 
FinAnciAl criSiS
MartIn t. Bohl, arne C. KleIn and 
PIerre l. sIKlos
aRe shoRt selleRs PosItIve 
feedback tRadeRs? evIdence 
fRom the Global fInancIal cRIsIs
Martin t. Bohl, arne C. Klein and Pierre l. siklos
during the recent global financial crisis, regulatory authorities in 
a number of countries imposed short-sale constraints aimed at 
preventing excessive stock market declines. the findings in this 
paper, however, suggest that short-selling bans do not contribute to 
enhancing financial stability.
Post-2015 
DeveloPment 
AgenDA: goAls, 
tArgets AnD 
InDIcAtors
Special RepoRt
Post-2015 develoPment aGenda: 
Goals, taRGets and IndIcatoRs
Barry Carin et al.
this special report examines the targets for the un Millennium 
development Goals (MdGs) that have been met and considers the 
global implications of the remaining unmet goals. the report reviews 
a menu of indicators for the candidate goals to inform the future 
process of selecting the post-2015 successors to the MdGs.
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